Author: David Zurabishvili

Instead of Introduction: April Theses of Bidzina Ivanishvili

When Georgia became a candidate country for European Union membership in December 2023, it was probably difficult to imagine that just nine months later, before the parliamentary elections, the Georgian government would find itself so opposed to its strategic allies that, instead of opening accession negotiations, the United States and European Union countries would openly refuse to meet with the country's officials. The entire ruling elite would face potential economic and political sanctions. Most importantly, the deterioration of relations at such a level did not occur due to a fatal coincidence of circumstances, but rather because of the active efforts of the Georgian government.

On April 29, 2024, the honorary chairman of "Georgian Dream" and the de facto ruler of the country presented, in a landmark speech at a rally in support of the government, what can be described as a qualitatively new vision of the historical and current political processes. This vision is fundamentally different from the perspective that has dominated Georgian politics since independence. According to this viewpoint, there exists a so-called Party of Global War, or the Collective West. Although Bidzina Ivanishvili did not name specific countries, it was clear that this party referred to the United States, the European Union, and the West in general. Ivanishvili accuses the West of numerous attempts to destabilize Georgia's political existence, orchestrate a coup d'état, undermine Georgian national and religious identity, and provoke a war against Russia.

The main theme of the election campaign was not the promise of a better life or even the preservation of the status quo, but rather the destruction and prohibition of the entire opposition as an agent of the West. Despite unprecedented protests from Georgian society, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the so-called Russian Law, which involves labeling organizations as servants of the interests of foreign powers, including those that receive at least 25 percent of their income from Western funds and grants. According to this law, the government can practically intervene in the activities of such organizations at any time and halt the implementation of their projects. 

"Georgian Dream" also adopted a law against LGBTQ propaganda, which prohibits this community in Georgia from engaging in any activities associated with their sexual identity, from rallies and demonstrations to films and performances. Additionally, since the spring, Georgian government officials have been cursing, mocking, and insulting American and European politicians, diplomats, and officials, far surpassing the rhetoric of Russia, Belarus, Iran, and other anti-Western countries.

The actions taken by the Georgian authorities inevitably provoked a response from the United States and the European Union. Currently, these entities view the Georgian authorities as adversaries, and this sentiment is reflected in their rhetoric. As a result, discussions about Georgia's potential accession to the European Union have come to a halt. Instead, there is growing speculation about large-scale sanctions, and the visa-free regime with Europe might also be reconsidered. Meanwhile, the West continues to alienate both the ruling government and the Georgian populace. The only factor preventing an irreversible separation from the West is the anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary elections, during which the entire opposition spectrum will challenge the government from a pro-Western stance. The future of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration hinges entirely on the outcomes of these elections.

It’s important to highlight another significant point. Current polls indicate that 80 percent of the Georgian population supports EU integration. Consequently, the Georgian government asserts that it also seeks a European path, but claims to do so "with dignity and peace." This statement appears contradictory given the prevailing anti-Western propaganda, prompting an intriguing question: why? Why did "Georgian Dream" choose to promote an anti-Western narrative before the elections in a nation where the majority leans pro-Western and views Russia as its primary adversary? What did they hope to achieve? It is clear that such rhetoric could undermine the government's reputation both at home and abroad. The answer to this perplexing situation is somewhat paradoxical, as it depends on the perspective from which we analyze it.

From The Oligarch's Perspective

To understand the nuances of modern Georgian politics, we need to grasp what type of governance system we have. Today, Georgia is characterized by the unlimited sole rule of one person: the honorary chairman of the "Georgian Dream" party, Bidzina Ivanishvili. In countries where state institutions are weak, the role of the individual is not only significant but also decisive—and this is true in our case. Ivanishvili alone makes political decisions, while all other state institutions—whether the government, parliament, or courts—act solely as executors of his will. How the country arrived at this point is a separate topic, but for now, let’s limit ourselves to simply stating the facts.

Furthermore, Bidzina Ivanishvili has a tendency to subscribe to conspiracy theories, believing that political processes are orchestrated by hidden forces rather than public figures. Thus, when he faces criticism for his shadow government, he interprets it as a personal affront. He assumes that those who criticize him operate under similar governmental structures in their own countries, viewing public appearances as mere facades. Simultaneously, his remarkable incompetence is intertwined with the power dynamics he learned from the oligarchic Russia of the 1990s, which he navigates with a certain adeptness. His approach to governance is characterized by a "divide and dominate" strategy, where he pits partners and subordinates against each other, manipulates secret recordings and other compromising information, and employs various underhanded tactics. In this model, words and promises are meaningless; one can say one thing today, something else tomorrow, and yet another thing the day after. In this context, Bidzina Ivanishvili embodies a typical figure from the 1990s oligarchy, unable to evolve beyond that era and still convinced that the Russian strategies and experiences from that time are relevant and beneficial in the global politics of the 2020s. When we analyze Bidzina Ivanishvili's recent actions through this, if we may call it, oligarchic-mafia lens, many aspects become clearer and more logical. This reasoning does not necessarily suggest that Ivanishvili is acting in a correct or just manner, but it does shed light on the motivations behind his misguided and unjust actions. 

The conflict began with the Swiss bank "Credit Suisse," where Bidzina Ivanishvili had invested a substantial portion of his financial assets. The bank engaged in financial manipulations, leading to significant losses for Ivanishvili, who subsequently decided to sue. This legal battle commenced eight years ago, and while Ivanishvili has won several court rulings, the matter remains unresolved. Ideally, this legal dispute shouldn't have escalated into a political issue; however, Ivanishvili, who is inclined to conspiracy theories, became convinced that the American government was blackmailing him through the bank and began to express this belief cautiously yet clearly in public. What was the likely response from the United States? They would likely attempt to persuade Ivanishvili diplomatically, behind the scenes rather than publicly. It’s a general principle in politics that even informal leaders of allied countries are not openly criticized or attacked. How did Ivanishvili interpret this? He saw it as a sign of weakness and an indirect admission of guilt, based on his oligarchic-mafia mindset. Consequently, rather than calming down, he escalated his rhetoric. What followed? After winning the court case against the bank, Ivanishvili viewed this as undeniable evidence that his aggressive stance had intimidated them and that America had retreated. (Doesn’t he believe that every government has its own Murusidze and Chinchaladze in the courts? Doesn’t he doubt the independence of the judiciary?!) He concluded that Georgia must be so significant to the United States that it cannot afford to escalate tensions openly, being "hampered" by NGOs and local entities. Ivanishvili suspects that many pro-Western politicians in Georgia are agents of America. Although he has always believed this, he wasn't concerned before and did not see the United States as an enemy or a threat to his power.

What happens next is that the bank, clearly, does not give up easily and is struggling with various excuses to avoid transferring the sums mandated by the court. As a result, Bidzina's behavior becomes increasingly defiant and impudent. Why should he give up on something that has brought him results? At the official level, this is manifested in the anti-Western rhetoric of Ivanishvili's proxies and representatives of the Georgian government, which is becoming more rigid and sharp. 

I recognize that what I’m describing may seem like a surreal narrative, but when a nation is governed by an incompetent individual fixated on conspiracy theories, with all state powers at his disposal, this phantasmagoria becomes a daily occurrence. It’s hard to predict how long this misguided escalation of tensions with the West would have continued and in what forms it might have manifested if Russia had not invaded Ukraine.

In War as in War

Prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and the West as a whole maintained a cautiously lukewarm attitude toward Russia. While Russia was not regarded as a friendly nation, it also wasn’t seen as a global or existential threat. The U.S. viewed China as its primary geopolitical adversary, and key European Union countries, particularly Germany and France, considered Russia more as a trade partner than a military or political danger. The strong anti-Russian sentiment in Eastern Europe was often seen as a reflection of historical trauma.

In this context, Ivanishvili's perspective on Russia—where the occupying country was either viewed positively or completely disregarded—aligned more closely with Western interests than the sharp anti-Russian rhetoric of the Georgian opposition parties, especially the "National Movement." This alignment helps explain why the West responded relatively mildly to Ivanishvili's conspiracy theories. In fact, he was even forgiven for "throwing down" the President of the European Council when the Georgian authorities first signed and agreed to the conditions set forth by Charles Michel's mediating mission, only to later withdraw that signature. However, this paradigm has shifted dramatically since the onset of the war in Ukraine. It has become evident that Russia's imperial ambitions have not disappeared, and reflecting more than just remnants of the past. This was further underscored by Putin's statements, in which he openly claimed that not only the territories of the former Soviet Union but also those of Tsarist Russia fall within his sphere of exclusive influence. Consequently, Russia is once again being perceived as an enemy of the West, and Europe is effectively returning to a Cold War-era mentality, where distinct boundaries are drawn between the spheres of influence of the West and Russia. 

Such a radical change in the geopolitical paradigm has not been easy for either Europe or the United States. The reorganization of relationship models and the relevant state-bureaucratic structures, established over decades, to adapt to this new reality is fraught with numerous technical and non-technical difficulties. However, the main matter here is a strategic decision rather than the challenges and shortcomings in the process of implementing this decision.

Georgia, along with its political landscape, could not remain unaffected by this geopolitical upheaval. Russia's aggression in Ukraine has intensified the threat posed by Russia, highlighting that if Russia were to succeed in Ukraine, its ambitions in the South Caucasus would likely expand as well. On the other hand, it has opened up unprecedented opportunities for integration into the European Union. In this new context, Georgia was considered part of the Western geopolitical space. When German Chancellor Scholz stated that Europe extends from Lisbon to Tbilisi, it was not merely a rhetorical flourish but a significant political declaration. The door to the European Union was opened for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, initiating the process of their accession to the EU. This process was compelled by circumstances, as none of these states met the minimum conditions for EU membership. Due to the situation, priority was given to a purely political factor: establishing a clear stance against Russian aggression.

Bidzina Ivanishvili could not accept the new geopolitical reality as a matter of principle and attempted to maintain a kind of neutral position—not only between the opposing sides on the front line but also toward the entire West and the so-called "Russky Mir". Ivanishvili sought to continue the policy toward Russia that he had pursued before the war, as the balance between Russia and the West was a significant component of his personal power due to his oligarchic practices. 

Attempts by Western countries to convince Ivanishvili to explicitly declare support for Ukraine were perceived by the de facto ruler of Georgia as attempts to drag him into the war, intensifying his conspiratorial fears that he was being ousted by the non-governmental sector. The Georgian government began talking about a "Global War Party," an anonymous mystical force that, according to them, has a significant influence on American and European politics. Georgian civil society and the opposition were also labeled as agents of this global party. The authorities denied that the global war party referred to Western countries, but any critical statements from the West were attributed to this party, suggesting that almost all Western leaders, including their ambassadors, were puppets of this mythical entity.

American and European Union officials made significant efforts to allay Ivanishvili's anxieties, and they succeeded to some extent. The Georgian authorities withdrew the Russian law adopted in the first reading and declared that they would not revisit this issue. Additionally, amendments to the legislation on gatherings and demonstrations were not pursued any further, as the Prime Minister of Georgia openly stated that there was no longer a threat of a coup, and therefore, there was no need to restrict rallies. Ultimately, the status of Georgia as a candidate for European Union membership was granted, even though the authorities of "Georgian Dream" had practically not fulfilled the requirements set by the European Commission.

Receiving the candidate status made Ivanishvili bolder and more convinced that a policy of threats and blackmail toward the West was successful and yielded results. This is where Ivanishvili made a fatal mistake: he decided to completely clear the political field before the upcoming parliamentary elections, ideologically and organizationally destroying the opposition, media, and the non-governmental sector. Essentially, he aimed to win the elections unopposed and then, backed by his newfound legitimacy, attack the West and demand a reset of relations on terms favorable to him. To achieve this, Ivanishvili pushed forward the so-called Russian law in Parliament and mobilized the entire state propaganda apparatus for an anti-Western campaign.

Shattered Dreams

To summarize, until recently, we had a paradoxical situation in which unqualified and conspiratorial views not only did not create any serious problems for Bidzina Ivanishvili but, by acting according to the logic based on these views, even brought him the status of a candidate for European Union membership. Consequently, Ivanishvili was fully convinced that his calculations were correct: the West needed Georgia more than Georgia needed the West, and that whatever he did would be successful. At the same time, Ivanishvili believed that a large portion of Georgian society was xenophobic, homophobic, and anti-liberal. He did not see himself as part of that group; instead, he thought of himself as a counterbalance to this perceived disaster. However, as he sought a convincing victory by 2024, he felt the need to maximize populist propaganda. Thus, Ivanishvili launched an anti-Western campaign to deliberately clear the domestic political field. According to his calculations, this would dramatically increase the ruling party's popularity among the people and completely discredit the opposition.

Of course, such severe incompetence could not ultimately end without failure, and indeed, practically all the initiatives intended to boost government support were buried. Bidzina Ivanishvili believed that the reversal of the Russian law would not provoke mass protests, as he thought that with sufficient propaganda, he could convince the youth that he was merely against of "grant-eaters" from some NGOs . However, he was mistaken.

He also believed that he was appealing to the masses with his homophobic rhetoric, but he could not, as the people did not take the government's rhetoric seriously. It seemed as if, if they were not elected again, the nation would degenerate, and "mother" would no longer be called "mother," while "father" would no longer be called "father."

He thought that by declaring Orthodoxy as the state religion, he was favoring the church and its congregation. However, this did not work out, as the church saw in this initiative a desire for state control and therefore refused to support it.

Finally, Ivanishvili believed that by apologizing to the separatists and blaming his own country for starting the war, he would receive at least some vague hint from Russia about the restoration of territorial integrity. Instead, he received nothing of the sort. On the contrary, Russia reiterated its policy to Ivanishvili: first began to refer to Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries, signing agreements not to attack them, and then proceeded to make demands that put him in a compromising position". 

In short, everything that, according to Ivanishvili's calculations, should have garnered political support resulted in the opposite effect. Instead of increasing support, the government faced unprecedented large-scale protests and widespread dissatisfaction among Georgian society. Additionally, Ivanishvili's expectation that the reversal of the Russian law and the strengthening of anti-Western rhetoric would not provoke a sharp reaction from the West proved to be incorrect. He assured his inner circle that there would be no sanctions and that all options for Georgia's accession to the European Union would remain open. The reality turned out to be much harsher, and today the government of Georgia is, in fact, a political pariah.

All of this came as a surprise to Bidzina Ivanishvili and his ruling team, affecting their campaign and rhetoric. With so little time left before the elections, a retreat from their current stance and a change in rhetoric could prove disastrous. Furthermore, the anti-Western rhetoric has become clearly counterproductive. It does not help that "Georgian Dream" publicly states its goal of joining the European Union, especially when EU member states unequivocally declare that, with such rhetoric and legislation, Georgia will never join the European Union.

Instead of a Conclusion: How Can It All End?

Bidzina Ivanishvili will retain the levers of power and sole management only if "Georgian Dream" wins the elections and the legitimacy of that victory is recognized by both Georgian society and the West. In this scenario, the West would also have to acknowledge reality. This is why the government repeatedly states that the main priority is to win the elections, after which everything will be "sorted out." However, the government "forgets" to mention that this victory must be legitimate and must occur under conditions of free and democratic elections. Given the current situation, I find it inconceivable that the votes for "Georgian Dream" will surpass those of the opposition that crosses the threshold. A change in government, I believe, will definitely happen. This change will occur even if the Central Election Commission (CEC) declares the government's victory, but neither the Georgian people nor the international community will recognize these results. Naturally, this would lead to large-scale protests, and the authorities effectively do not have the resources to manage them. It is difficult to predict who exactly will come to power instead of "Georgian Dream," but we may see a genuine coalition government for the first time, rather than a situation where everything is ruled by one person and his narrow entourage. We can all clearly see—along with many others—how far such governance has brought the country and how it has affected Ivanishvili and his associates. I believe the entire pre-election period of 2024, starting with the turning point of the Russian law, will be remembered as a clear illustration of how a politician should not behave and what actions should be avoided under any circumstances.