Rusudan Shelia
In Washington, a one-day discussion entitled “The Future of Russia – A Challenge for US Foreign Policy” was held with the participation of Ukrainians, American experts, former high-ranking officials, as well as Russian oppositionists. In addition to the fact that the panelists and invited guests discussed the consequences of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years later from quite different perspectives, I was particularly interested in the views of Russian politicians themselves. Among them were discussions about what might happen in Russia after Putin’s rule ends, how the structure of the current Kremlin regime should change, whether Russian society wants this change in general, and how prepared the citizens themselves are for this process. Among them were representatives of national minorities, who are now part of the Russian Federation. One of the main speakers of the discussion was Ilya Ponomarev, a Russian politician and former member of the State Duma from 2007 to 2016. Ponomarev was the only member of the Russian State Duma to vote against Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea. He was later forced to seek refuge in the United States, from where he traveled to Ukraine and obtained Ukrainian citizenship. In 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ponomarev joined the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces and called on Russian citizens to take up arms against the Kremlin. In 2023, Moscow added Ponomarev to its list of terrorists and extremists, and accused him of high treason. Ponomarev worked closely with the “Russian Freedom Legion,” an armed group of Russians fighting on the side of Kyiv. We spoke to Ilya Ponomarev in Washington, D.C.:
- Let’s start with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. In your opinion, what are Putin's current goals three years after the large-scale invasion?
- I think that in this case, we should focus on several issues. First of all, it is clear that, in addition to the geopolitical picture, the main trigger of this war was exclusively Putin’s personal egoism and tactical interest. It all started in 2014, when Putin needed to compensate for a strategic defeat. A popular joke in Ukraine is that Yanukovych is the only president in world history who was ousted twice by the same revolution. Both times, he was supported by Putin; therefore, Putin could not admit that he had become a “loser.” In general, he makes the wrong bets, but he made the wrong bet twice on the same process and lost both times. Therefore, he needed to compensate for the defeat with some kind of victory and turn the situation around.
- Was the invasion of Ukraine a result of Yanukovych's defeat, and not a manifestation of a previously developed plan by the Kremlin?
- I don't think so. I see absolutely no indication that this was planned in advance, and if it was, it was very poorly planned. On the contrary, there are many indications that this was a rather spontaneous reaction, aimed at short-term results. I think they were simply acting in parallel with the development of the situation because they had no pre-planned, well-calculated actions. The Kremlin was preparing for the next elections in Ukraine, and they thought that the Crimea card could be used if the elections went in the wrong direction—at least from their point of view—to conduct them properly. Not to return the territory, but to incite unrest, spread speculation, and run PR campaigns. The actual annexation was not prepared at that time. In any case, the military was not ready, and the political structure among them did not seem prepared either. They had people in place who made decisions based on how events unfolded. That’s why I do not believe this wasn't a well-developed plan. As for 2022, I think the idea of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine was born in the spring of 2021. It was more a reaction to internal fears and prejudices. In 2014, Putin, parallel to the events in Ukraine, saw the solution in the annexation of Crimea. But then his inner circle—Glazyev, Zatulin, Sergey Ivanov, and Molefiev—said that everything was developing besides them - Surkov and Shoigu are heroes, and we, as if, were behind this process, so we should do something similar and become heroes too. Additionally, Molefiev had large debts to Nishtorbank and VTB Bank. A criminal case was also opened against him. So, again, he needed to become a hero so that the case against him would be dropped. It all seemed to develop like this… I’m not joking. Later, we saw Strelkov as Malafeyev’s security chief, who could be sent to the ground. They made a pact with Sergei Ivanov. Everything developed unpredictably. Then Putin decided to intervene and involved Surkov in the process. Surkov immediately sabotaged this process and created the so-called gray zone, which he particularly likes to do. Surkov likes to create situations where no one understands what is happening—neither peace nor war, just some intermediate state. In fact, he stopped the so-called Russian Spring with this. Surkov is a realist; he realized that he did not have enough people on the ground. They lacked sufficient public support in Ukraine to achieve results, but at the same time, he was carrying out orders. This is how the situation turned into a “gray zone.” I think that if they had continued like this, they would have been quite satisfied with the Minsk agreements. These allowed international speculation and domestic campaigns, and Putin did not come out as a “loser” either because he achieved the main victory with Crimea. Putin was quite satisfied with this. However, in the spring of 2021—or more precisely, at the end of winter 2021—ideas arose in Moscow that Ukrainians were preparing a counterattack on Donetsk and were ready to destroy them. A large part of this society, including some members of the government, reported that the entire system of government in Donetsk and Luhansk was determined. At the same time, they wrote that the military was disorganized, that the idea of a disintegrated state was on the shelf, and if the Ukrainians did something, it would collapse. They spread these fears and panic quite seriously in the Kremlin. If you look at what the Kremlin was saying at the time, you will see they were sounding the alarm that Ukrainians were going to attack. Of course, Ukrainians perceived this entire process differently and claimed that this actually showed Russia's desire to attack Ukraine. But I will repeat once again: all my sources confirm this, and logic dictates it, that in reality, everything was the other way around—Russia was truly scared they would be attacked. They started bringing troops to the borders because, in case the Ukrainians acted, they would enter the regions to retaliate and try to hold the front line. When this military concentration was organized, I believe that was when Putin began actively discussing the idea that this time he could attack Ukraine. They met with Biden in the summer of 2021. Putin understood that the Americans were in a weak position and that they would not take serious steps. Putin is a brilliant psychologist—he has very bad qualities in almost all areas, but he can really understand the psychology of people. He has the ability to read people. So, Putin understood that Biden is a weak person, and they would only be seriously worried if an invasion occurred. The Kremlin then began developing a plan for an attack. If you look, after the meeting with Biden, US intelligence started to give hints that there was a plan for Russia to attack Ukraine.
- And how accurately did Putin assess the situation three years ago? Did he get what he wanted, or did he fail in his calculations?
- Personally, I believe that if you do not achieve your goals in a war, it means you have lost—because war is fought to achieve specific objectives. It’s clear that Putin cannot achieve his initial goal, which was to capture Kyiv and replace the Ukrainian government with a puppet regime. This means he has already lost the campaign that began in 2022. Now, the question is, what is happening on the Ukrainian side? The Ukrainians managed to preserve their sovereignty, prevent the aggressor from capturing the capital, and stop the installation of a puppet government. But at the same time, they cannot achieve sustainable peace. Without sustainable peace, the country will turn into ruins. Even if the bombing and shelling stop, without foreign investment and security guarantees, the country would not develop. That’s why the only way for Ukraine to achieve lasting peace is to see the end of Putin’s rule. And that is not happening. This is why we are in a state of strategic exhaustion. The West has shown a very hypocritical approach. The Biden administration’s stance has been: “We must not let Ukraine lose, but we will not let Ukraine win either—we must not defeat Russia.” They want to stop the aggression and push back the Russian forces, but not to defeat them, so as not to destroy the Russian regime—or Russia itself. That was their position, driven by fear of the possible consequences.
- There were hints of real risks—perhaps Russia was even considering using nuclear weapons…
-That’s quite strange, because, if I’m not mistaken, the United States is also a nuclear power. So, it’s a strange position—well, Russia is a nuclear power, so we do whatever they want. But the question is, how do they calculate the risks? It would be absolutely understandable if American tanks invaded Russia and tried to take Moscow. In such a situation, I would seriously imagine Russia using nuclear weapons. We’re talking about a scenario where Western allies support certain political processes in a non-military way. What context does Putin have in this situation to use nuclear weapons? You know, even his close circle would not allow it. If the West simply waits for Putin to die or for a regime change in Russia, I think there’s a good chance that power could transfer to even darker figures. Right now, because of this war, the so-called Z-patriotism has become quite popular in Russia. If Putin, for some reason, disappears, who has the best chance of gaining influence? Formally, Mishustin should come to power as Prime Minister, but in terms of influence, everyone will try to win the favor of the Z-patriots because they are armed and motivated. This actually increases the risk of negative changes, and the possibility of a much more serious confrontation than before. So, in fact, the risk will be mitigated if we avoid thinking about regime change from within Russia at this moment.
- According to polls, the majority of Russian society actually supports the war. How is it possible to change the regime if most of the population supports Putin and the Kremlin’s policies?
- Russians live in a manipulated environment where they believe that nothing depends on them. Polls are manipulated and distorted. For example, if you ask a Russian citizen, “Do you support Putin’s policy of continuing the war?”, they will answer, “Yes, yes.” But if you ask the same person, “Do you support Putin’s decision to stop the war?”, they will also say “Of course,” meaning that someone who supports the war will also say they want peace. It’s simply a matter of math: if 70% support victory in the war, then about 70% also say they want peace—it's a contradiction, but it’s easily explained. These people have come to terms with the fact that they cannot influence their rulers or government decisions. So, it’s natural.
- And the opposition is not able to take proactive action either…
- There are no real parties in Russia anymore—only certain opposition groups.
- And how realistic is your vision of regime change?
- We need to observe how many people are actually willing to defend the regime. We’ve discussed extensively here in Washington and in Kyiv how unstable Putin’s regime really is. I predicted Prigozhin’s uprising and that he wouldn’t encounter resistance. In Washington and Kyiv, they told me I didn’t understand the situation—that it was an illusion, that people would resist, and that Prigozhin wouldn’t accomplish anything; he would be dealt with severely. When this actually happened, and Prigozhin headed for Moscow, if he hadn’t reached an agreement with Lukashenko, he definitely would have entered Moscow. When he launched this, there was no resistance at all. Prigozhin was not stopped by force—he was stopped through diplomacy. Then the same people in Washington and Kyiv told me: “Well, you were right, but that’s Prigozhin, who is worse than Putin. If we, the Ukrainians, or your legion had done this, we would have faced strong resistance.” I replied, “Well, whatever you think…” After that, the invasion of Kursk began, and the Ukrainians did not encounter resistance there either. It took the Kremlin several days to organize some response. It was especially noticeable that local Russians did not resist the Ukrainians. The Kremlin was forced to pay North Korean troops to station in Kursk to hold back the Ukrainians. This fact also confirms my logic: no one in Russia truly wants to defend the regime. Yes, they are loyal to it—no one wants to fight against it—but at the same time, no one wants to protect it. Ordinary Russians, especially security forces, retreat at the first sign of threat and adopt an observer stance, waiting for the situation to develop. That’s why there is a competition over who has more power. If Russian volunteer groups have enough strength, they can easily repeat what Prigozhin did. Imagine the numbers: Prigozhin sent 4,500 fighters to Moscow; currently, Russian volunteer troops in Ukraine number about 1,500. This number isn’t small because volunteers are generally reluctant to join, mainly due to pressure from Washington. Achieving numbers comparable to Prigozhin’s is entirely feasible—it's just a matter of resources—but such a goal is not on the current agenda.
- At the same time, we see that the negotiations are, so far, fruitless, and we are not moving towards results as quickly as we had hoped. What do you think the outcome of these negotiations could be?
- My view is a little different from the Ukrainian mainstream, but also somewhat different from what the Washington administration thinks. I believe Putin is actually quite sensitive to reaching an agreement, but it is in our Russian character that when you are offered something, you never accept it outright. If it’s something you take for granted, you have to negotiate for more. Putin is a judoka who always knows how to use the opponent’s weight to his advantage. He says: "Okay, Trump wants to get the Nobel Peace Prize. So jump higher, please." That’s exactly what happens. Putin is a player—he is a master of bluffing and this kind of moves. At the same time, he plays too much, but he counts on the fact that the American administration is short on time, and he himself can easily continue the status quo for another year—sit and wait, demanding more concessions.
- I would also like to ask you about Georgia as well, because you know the Kremlin elite and their signature actions very well. What is their task in Georgia now?
- Of course, Russia wants to maintain its influence in Georgia based on fear. Naturally, Russia does not want Georgia to become part of NATO; they want to keep a regime loyal to them in power for as long as possible.
- How loyal is the “Georgian Dream” to the Kremlin?
- I think they are not as loyal as some oppositionists suggest. I do not see Bidzina Ivanishvili as just an agent of Russia. He is a businessman, so money is more important to him than political or geopolitical issues. He wants to keep Georgia for himself, as a personal playground. Therefore, he does not need anyone who might take this playground away from him—neither Russia, nor the European Union, nor anyone else. Ivanishvili wants to privatize the country in his own interests. We have seen this in many post-Soviet countries... The best way to achieve this is to maintain good relations with Russia. He has significant leverage in Moscow to say that if he is not there, then a regime hostile to the Kremlin will come to power, which would immediately jump into the arms of Europeans and NATO. He tells the Kremlin that it’s better for them to keep Ivanishvili in power. It’s worth noting that he does not fully fall into Moscow’s embrace because he understands what is happening in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. So, he seems to be keeping his distance. At the same time, as far as I know, he does business with Igor Sechin, Yevtushenko, and several other important Russian players.
- In Russia?
- No, in Georgia.
- And how long will the Kremlin be able to protect Ivanishvili, given that at least 80% of Georgian citizens do not want to be under uncontrolled Russian influence? How does Russia help Ivanishvili in this context?
- Of course, primarily financially. You know, there’s a Russian saying that’s very popular in the Kremlin: “Money conquers the devil.” Ivanishvili is similar to Yanukovych in Ukraine. Russia has never wanted to fully take over Ukraine because maintaining a certain distance allows a regime like the Kremlin’s to maneuver. If you control the situation financially, you can say that everything else is a matter of the people’s will. With this approach, the Kremlin creates the illusion that countries are independent because it doesn’t want to take on all the obligations itself—ultimately, it controls everything behind the scenes.
- Returning to Ivanishvili’s Russian business partners in Georgia—what is their main business, or Ivanishvili helps Russians evade sanctions?
- I don’t closely monitor their relations or the details of their agreements. My insiders say they have officially changed the structure, but the beneficiaries remain the same. There are some joint businesses, but I won’t go into the details here.
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