Rusudan Shelia

Russian businessman and opponent of Putin's regime, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, founded a new so-called think tank in Washington, D.C., called NEST (New Eurasian Strategies Centre). The first panel discussion for this organization was held on February 11. The Russian oppositionist spoke at length about his vision for what expectations Russian President Vladimir Putin might have under the new White House administration, and what measures Washington needs to take to at least weaken the Kremlin's war machine. After the panel discussion, I asked him to share his vision of the ongoing processes in Georgia. During our conversation, it became clear that Mikhail Khodorkovsky had business relations with Bidzina Ivanishvili while in Moscow, although he spoke quite cautiously about the details. Our meeting took place in Washington, before the Munich conference:

- First of all, thank you very much for agreeing to this interview. I think it will be interesting to hear your observations on the political processes taking place in Georgia, but first let’s start with Ukraine. Given how well you know Putin, what kind of changes can we expect in the Kremlin's foreign policy under the new administration in the White House?

- Under the Democratic Party administration, it has become clear that the processes have reached a deadlock over the past few months. I don’t know how the Ukrainians themselves assessed this, but it was evident to domestic observers that the war was being waged on a principle of attrition. The supply of weapons did not match Russia's resources, which is why Ukraine is losing the war of military attrition. It was also clear that the Biden administration had no other type of offer. They could have slightly increased the scale of the supply, but this is no longer decisive. We have a saying: it’s better to have a nightmare ending than a nightmare without an ending. Considering all this, the turning point that would be inevitable in this process if a Trump administration were to come might offer some hope. That is why, personally, I am in a state of hope—not because I know something about this administration that others do not, but simply because when everything is very bad and then some change occurs, you no longer know whether this is a step toward good or the opposite, though you want to hope for the best.

- Naturally, these geopolitical processes around Ukraine have their own impact on Georgia as well. We, Georgians, have long felt that the Kremlin has its influence at the government level in Tbilisi. From your point of view, how do you see the political process that has developed very rapidly in the last two years in Georgia?

- I am actively following developments in Ukraine; however, I unfortunately do not observe the ongoing processes in Georgia in such depth. I can only speak based on what I hear from those who sought refuge in Georgia from Russia and were then forced to leave. According to our human rights defenders, the risks in Georgia have increased significantly for Russian citizens who oppose the Putin regime. The risks have increased to the point where they have been forced to leave Georgia. Although I have been to Georgia many times and know a lot about the country and have acquaintances there, it is very difficult to predict how events will unfold. Of course, I feel very sorry for Mikheil Saakashvili. There are many ways to assess him, but I sympathize with him as a person. I would really like him to be released. Whether he stays in politics or not is not my business, but I would be very pleased to see Mikheil Saakashvili released. He has already spent enough time in prison. If it were up to me, I would even ask someone to assist in this. I would be happy to do this if it would help reduce the number of political prisoners in Georgia. This issue is quite painful for me, psychologically.

- Regarding Bidzina Ivanishvili, we have very little information about his past in Moscow. What do you know about him, or what did you hear about him while you were in Moscow?

- I knew Ivanishvili when he was known as Boris. Of course, he was Bidzina then, but we referred to him as Boris. At that time, he was one of the heads of the bank "Russian Credit" along with another person whose name I have forgotten. It was a large Russian bank, and since I also owned a bank at that time, we cooperated. I knew Boris as an entrepreneur who was a rather reserved person, and I think he has remained that way. He was a very professional entrepreneur and banker. He fulfilled all the obligations assigned to him, and I cannot recall a time when he acted dishonestly. Yes, we were competitors; I considered his bank a competitor, but he was a fairly honest one. After that, I moved to the oil industry, he continued his business, and eventually disappeared from my view. Now that I know he plays a vital role in Georgia, these processes interest me, and I have a desire to visit Tbilisi at some point to see what is happening there. However, not at this stage, given the risks and the fact that Putin has the opportunity… I don’t know how great this opportunity is, but it is significant enough for him to intervene and resolve issues—issues that Putin’s circle wants to resolve radically.

- Does this mean that Kremlin has considerable influence on Bidzina Ivanishvili, especially considering he calmly withdrew a substantial amount of money from Russia?

- I don’t have concrete information to confirm this; I have my own personal views. Based on this perspective, if a person has already taken money out of Russia, I can’t say that he still truly depends on those who gave him permission to do so. He took the money out, and that’s it. There may be another problem. For instance, if I were in Ivanishvili's place, the situation would be quite difficult. We understand that if he wanted to, Putin could easily annex Georgia. This isn’t Ukraine! Of course, there would be casualties and guerrilla battles, but Putin could annex Georgia in an instant. On the other hand, it is clear that Georgian society does not want to be easily subjugated. Any intelligent person currently in Georgian politics needs to maneuver between these two tendencies. One tendency is to consider the desires of Georgian society and, within their capabilities, maintain as much sovereignty as possible. On the other hand, you should understand that if you don’t take at least a small step toward the Kremlin, you might lose everything. This was the situation in Finland for decades. We know from history how long the Finnish government tried to maneuver to maintain its independence. They were heavily dependent on Kremlin influence, but they managed to maintain a degree of independence that eventually led to NATO membership. If they had made a mistake back then, they would have lost Finland.

- Is it relevant for you to compare the current realities of Finland and Georgia?

- For an internal observer, the current situation in Georgia resembles the process that has been ongoing in Finland for decades. Stalin's troops could have easily taken Helsinki, so an agreement had to be reached then. The conditions of that agreement were quite severe and lasted for a decade. This situation changed only in the 90s—35 years later—and the country became a member of NATO. For me, Georgia is in a similar situation now.

- Since we have limited time to talk, I will finally ask you: do you think that peaceful and cooperative neighborliness between Georgia and Russia is possible?

- I see no reason why this should not be possible. Today, the world is completely different. Such relations can be very beneficial for countries, and there is no need to interfere in another state's affairs to establish mutually beneficial relations.

- Is this possible under the Putin regime?

- As long as Putin is alive and in power, risks will always exist for Georgia. He, like all dictators historically, is becoming increasingly dependent on his environment. Who will emerge from his inner circle is something you and I cannot predict. Given this, any Georgian politician should support a policy of balance.