Rusudan Shelia

"Georgian Dream" has taken off its masks"—this is how Natalie Tocci, one of the most influential representatives of Italian civil society, assesses the recent events in Georgia. Speaking to Globalnews.ge, Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali states that through "Georgian Dream," Russia is gaining strength in the South Caucasus while losing influence over Armenia: 

- The Georgian Dream felt the need to pretend that it had some democratic, pro-European, and pro-Atlantic credentials, as that is where the majority of the population lies in terms of its views. I find that they always had a rather clever way of, on one hand, showing a pro-European face, while at the same time insinuating doubts about the commitment that Europeans or Americans would have to Georgia. They essentially argue that, given the horrible Russian bear next door and our history—which demonstrates that we can't really trust our allies in the West—the smart thing to do is to play it safe and not antagonize Russia too much. For a long time, the approach towards Russia was not overtly confrontational. They conveyed the message that, as a small country, we shouldn't expect friends to come to our rescue, especially since they didn't in 2008. Thus, we had to play it safe, and if we didn't, we could see the consequences—Ukraine serves as a clear manifestation of this. For a while, I think that was the line. Then, progressively—though I don't fully understand why, and you probably know more than I do—they felt there was less need to pretend. The masks started coming off. The first attempt was the passing of the Russian law, which sparked the initial wave of demonstrations. There was then a suspension of this approach, but they obviously thought the time was right to try again and believed they could suppress dissent. The truth is that they succeeded. This is what happens with authoritarian players, especially if they are clever. They don't act all at once; they do it step by step, pushing the envelope each time. The next envelope that was pushed was related to the elections, and now there’s further pressure regarding the presidency. Additionally, between the election and the nomination of the new president, there was a suspension of accession negotiations. Each time, they take a step they believe they can afford, mixing repression with the understanding that the West is not coming to their rescue. I hope that this calculation is wrong. I hope they have gone too far and that this will lead to their downfall. But until that happens, you never really know whether that’s the case or if their bet will pay off. We don’t know yet, because they haven't pushed it far enough.

- When you mentioned that the mask is off, may I ask directly if that means the Russian scenario in the South Caucasus is now obvious? Is the Georgian Dream party not only trying to remain in power but also implementing Russian interests in the region, from your perspective?

- You can see this developing in two very different directions. Since 2022, Russia has been using significant influence in the Caucasus. If you take a snapshot of the South Caucasus today and compare it to five years ago, you could argue that Russia has lost influence. For example, in Armenia. I think it's precisely this loss that has prompted Russia to increase its involvement through the Georgian Dream party. They felt they had to do something to reverse the situation, which is what has led us to our current predicament.

- Regarding the reaction from the West, do you think Europe is responding adequately to the situation in Georgia? Do you believe more support from the EU is necessary? If the reaction is slow, what do you think the reason is?

- The lazy answer is divisions, which is correct, but it’s also a bit simplistic. You can point to Hungary's veto and the need for unanimity in European foreign policy. However, when something is deemed sufficiently important, member states can find ways to push through obstacles posed by smaller countries like Hungary. The less lazy answer is to ask why the rest are not doing enough. The answer is distraction—there's a lot going on, including the situation in Ukraine and the Middle East. The EU is in a precarious state right now, having lost much of its normative compass. Yes, the EU should be doing much more. It should be sanctioning and signaling support for demonstrators while also punishing those who violate rights. Currently, there’s a lack of clarity from the EU. I believe this is a time when some member states should take the initiative, beyond the formal institutional framework, perhaps with the participation of the HRVP. For instance, the E3+3 negotiation format for the Iranian nuclear agreement was not a formal EU initiative. If things are stagnant at the institutional level regarding Georgia, we cannot simply wait for civil society to be completely crushed.

- I’m sure you’ve followed the recent statements from Georgian Dream party leaders, who claimed that not only Hungary but also Italy rejected sanctions against them in the EU. However, the Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry stated this was a lie. Can you provide insight into how Italian officials view this process?

- Italy falls into the category of distracted states. It is not against sanctions but is not particularly engaged in the Caucasus. Italy will not support Hungary in opposing sanctions. The issue is that Italy is not at the forefront of those advocating for proactive support of civil society. It tends to follow rather than lead, but they will follow if there is a critical mass moving towards a more assertive position.

- Lastly, if you have a message for Georgian civil society representatives and the Georgian people at this critical moment, what would it be?

- I realize this may not be a comforting message, but there are many Europeans—and Georgians among them—who feel strongly about the situation and are frustrated with European institutions and governments for not doing more. There is a connection between Georgian civil society and other European civil societies, which is important. In a sense, they are not alone. The inaction of governments and institutions should not translate into a feeling of abandonment. Many in Europe believe that Georgia is part of Europe. So, don’t let that flame die out; you are not alone. There are people like me who are appalled by how our governments are behaving—not just regarding Georgia, but on other issues as well. Georgian civil society must continue its efforts for its own survival, and there is an alternative. The broader message is that there are others, beyond governments and institutions, working to encourage them to do much more.